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List of abbreviations 
 
AMIF: Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund  
CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union  
CPT: European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading  
Treatment or Punishment  
ECHR: European Convention on Human Rights  
ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights  
HHC: Hungarian Helsinki Committee  
IAO: Immigration and Asylum Office (former OIN)  
NDGAP: National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing (former IAO) 
OIN: Office of Immigration and Nationality  
PTSD: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
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About the project 
 
RESPOND is a Horizon 2020 project which aims at studying the multilevel governance of 
migration in Europe and beyond. The consortium is formed of 14 partners from 11 source, 
transit and destination countries and is coordinated by Uppsala University in Sweden. The 
main aim of this Europe-wide project is to  provide an in-depth understanding of the 
governance of recent mass migration at macro, meso and micro levels through cross-country 
comparative research and to critically analyse governance practices with the aim of enhancing 
the migration governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and 
third countries.  
RESPOND will study migration governance through a narrative which is constructed along 
five thematic fields: (1) Border management and security, (2) Refugee protection regimes, (3) 
Reception policies, (4) Integration policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization. Each thematic 
field is reflecting a juncture in the migration journey of refugees and designed to provide a 
holistic view of policies, their impacts and responses given by affected actors within. 
In order to better focus on these themes, we divided our research question into work packages 
(WPs). The present report is concerned with the findings related to WP4, which focuses 
specifically on reception policies, practices and humanitarian responses to the current refugee 
crisis. Despite efforts to achieve harmonization (especially promoted by the 2016 CEAS and 
by the ENP), relevant differences exist in this field in the countries that are the object of 
research (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Sweden, UK, Turkey 
and Lebanon). WP4 will map the policies and practices of reception and humanitarian 
responses of the afore-mentioned countries and migrants’ perceptions, actions and reactions 
to policies and practices. The main objectives of WP4 are as follows:  
 
● to develop a mapping of policies and practices of reception in the countries being 
researched;  
 
● to develop a typology of these policies, practices and responses 
 
● to assess the coherence of these policies and practices with respect to international 
and EU standard 
 
● to study migrants’ perceptions, actions and reactions to policies and practices 
  
● to provide basic information in the area of reception for the development of all 
subsequent WPs.   
 
The last point will be achieved through an additional comparative report that will be based 







This report shows how the inhuman border protection and protection policies of the Hungarian 
government have triggered an adverse refugee reception environment. This is despite very 
few numbers of refugees currently in the country and even minimal number of people in the 
current reception system. As we have raised in the previous WP2 Hungary Border 
Management country report,1 there are grave cases concerning the implementation of the EU 
directives affecting the delivery of refugee reception policies as well. Moreover, the hostile 
reception policies are not only affecting refugees, but also activities as well as the morale of 
the humanitarian workers in the country. Hence, the hostility towards refugees starts with the 
political discourse that retains perennial crisis narrative, hits border management practices, 
ripples into reception policy, and has an adverse impact on the more general delivery of 
humanitarianism in the country.  
 
To this extent, this report finds the following.  
 
• The Hungarian reception policy follows a centralised, top-down model regarding 
asylum and immigration policy. It involves both the Police and Armed Forces.  
• Transit zones have essentially become the only reception facility. They also function 
as de facto detention centres.  
• As of December 2018, there were only three people hosted at the existing reception 
facilities. There is only one designated facility for vulnerable asylum seekers, except 
the Children’s Home in Fót. We cannot establish the number of asylum seekers in 
these facilities at the moment of writing.  
• Effectively, the transit zones operate as reception facilities. We have discussed the 
situation in the transit zones in detail in WP2 Border Management country report for 
Hungary.  
• The government is using the “crisis situation caused by mass migration” narrative in 
order to curb asylum seekers’ rights.  
• Asylum-seekers have no access to labour market. 
• While there are food provisions in the reception centres, due to the “constant state of 
crisis caused by mass migration”, travel allowances, reimbursement of educational 
expenses, financial support to facilitate potential return is now suspended.  
• Even food provisions are dire. The food provisions in the transit zones are limited to 
canned food, and the asylum seekers have no access to diverse or healthy diet unless 
social workers provide them. The Hungarian government used starvation as a tactic to 
force the asylum-seekers leave the transit zone back to Serbia from August 2018 to 
May 2019.  
• Sexual minorities have been verbally abused and/or threatened by security guards in 
one of the reception centres.  
                                               
1Available online at: https://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1334555/FULLTEXT01.pdf  
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• The activities of the humanitarian actors for service provision and intervene on behalf 
of the asylum-seekers are extremely limited. This also removes any possibility of an 
independent overview of the activities of the Hungarian officials.  
• The Hungarian government has institutionalised its own Charity Council at the expense 
of leaving independent humanitarian agencies out. However, it is not very clear what 
kind of services these agencies provide in the transit zones.  
• There is no “welcome culture” to talk about in the Hungarian case as the Hungarian 







An unreceptive essence has qualified refugee reception policies worldwide. Hungary is no 
exception, but it is one extreme. The security narrative that substantiated its border 
management and protection policies have simply seeped into its reception policies as well. As 
this report will show, this has three crucial consequences. The first one is the dire straits that 
these policies have put the most vulnerable in their asylum procedures. The second is how 
Hungarian migration policies, including its reception policies as this report shows, have made 
the requirements of the European Union directives almost completely irrelevant in an EU 
country. This makes the country unaccountable internationally. The third one is how the 
unreceptive and welcoming character of these policies not only has placed the asylum-seeker 
and refugee rights in peril, but also curtailed the activities of the humanitarian actors’ 
autonomy, authority, and eventually capacity to intervene. Having checks and balances in any 
political system forces governments to be accountable. Thereby, by removing this 
accountability mechanism from its reception policy implementation by merely punishing the 
humanitarian sector, the Hungarian government also became unaccountable domestically for 
its activities. Furthermore, amidst hindered accountability, it has also consolidated a public 
audience supportive of its inhuman treatment of asylum-seekers. This essentially suggests a 
form of discursive governance2 of migration policies, including reception, widely resting on and 
reflecting from the political discourse of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.  
 
This report presents this case based on our reading of Hungarian language sources as well 
as interviews at meso- and micro-levels to see the implementation of reception policies. In 
order, we refer to policies and legal regulations of reception. Our findings show that there is 
no space for multi-level governance to reception policy, given the full scale centralisation and 
outsourcing of reception facilities and policy delivery to armed and security forces in Hungary. 
In order, we discuss practices of reception such as housing, education and labour market, and 
services and allowances. However, inevitably, our discussion always refers back to detention 
effective at transit zones. At the time of writing, the 2018 figures showed a mere number of 3 
people in reception facilities beyond the transit zones. Furthermore, we note encounter with 
officials, civic actors, and the receiving society reflecting on micro-level interviews with 
refugees in Hungary. We support our findings from the micro-level with our reflections on the 
meso-level based on interviews with stakeholders and humanitarian actors. Finally, we state 
“welcome culture” of its lack thereof in the country, and present this as a case whereby neither 
international nor national accountability procedures could hold sway against the government 
propaganda based on a crisis of mass migration narrative. Relatedly, we show that the 
Hungarian government can simply appeal to public philosophy3 regarding migration and 
inculcate certain fears in the society but eventually nullify the global human rights norms and 
decapacitate their implementation in a European Union country. We hope the findings of this 
report raise the European and international attention to human rights violations Hungary yet 
again as we have previously done with our border management practices report.  
                                               
2 Korkut et al. (2015).  
3 See Korkut (2014). 
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Methodology and Sources 
The report brings together a review of key political developments, policy instruments, and 
political narratives from Hungary after 2011, but more specifically from 2015 onward. In terms 
of sources, we use primary academic, policy, and political speech texts translated from 
Hungarian. The quotes and references to Hungarian language texts are our translations. The 
legal texts encompass acts, decrees and decisions in relation to reception and border 
management and migration controls. As border management policies and practices are 
organically interlinked with the reception policy – simply due to detention of asylum seekers in 
transit zones, our methodology inevitably approximates that of the former.  
To discuss implementation, we have turned to reports from European Union, independent 
authorities as well as the interviews that we held in Hungary in 2018.  
The report reflects on 20 interviews with refugees in Hungary. Most of them are from 
Afghanistan with a few from Syria and Iraq. However, as they mostly have gained their refugee 
status before 2015, their experiences reflect on the situation before the introduction of the 
widescale crisis of mass migration narrative by the Orbán government following the sudden 
increase in the number of arrivals in the summer of 2015.  
We carried out 10 interviews with migration stakeholders including non-governmental 
organisation representatives as well as a lawyer, social workers, and activists. We also 
interviewed a source, who preferred to remain anonymous, from the Border Force department 
within the Police. We also include an interview with a source at IOM Budapest office. For 
fieldwork, we visited Hungary on two occasions in summer and winter during 2018. We could 
then also follow the impact of a series of migration-control-related legislations on the mood 
and operation of the non-public migration stakeholders.  
We have received positive responses and initial invitations from the Csongrád County local 
government as well as the UNHCR Office in Budapest. However, both partners have declined 
the formal interview request later. For us, this showed how the atmosphere of fear has been 
hitting the country affecting all private, public, and international actors involved in migration 
governance.  
Furthermore, we also visited a refugee camp on the Serbian border in Subotica in December 
2018. Essentially, our goal for this visit was to understand how refugees gain access to the 
transit zones at the Hungarian-Serbian border. Below, we discuss our findings from this visit.  
Finally, we brought together the findings from textual analysis with legal and policy 
developments and have embedded findings from interviews and ethnographic research tools 
where it suits in order to have a comprehensive analysis of reception policy practices in 
Hungary between 2011 and 2017. 
 
 
Policies and Legal Regulations of Reception: Missing Multi-level 
Perspective  
The Hungarian reception policy follows a centralised, top-down model regarding asylum and 
immigration policy. It is sanctioned and organised at the national level featuring no municipal 
or regional characteristics. As of July 2019, the National Directorate-General for Aliens 
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Policing (NDGAP), the legal successor of the former Immigration and Asylum Office (IAO), the 
former Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), is responsible for all matters of immigration 
and asylum in Hungary including reception. Reception centres are run by NDGAP in 
cooperation with and with the supplementary services of NGOs.4 The supervisory body of 
NDGAP is the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The institutional structure of NDGAP comprises a 
head office (together with the Pest county directorate) in Budapest, and regional directorates 
in Pécs, Szeged, Debrecen, Miskolc, Székesfehérvár and Győr. The developments in July 
2019 have put more at stake beyond a simple name change. The Government has now 
effectively incorporated asylum authority under the authority of the Police and the remit of the 
Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police and the Act XLII of 2015 on the Service Status of Professional 
Members of Law Enforcement Agencies.5 It is important to note that both the Police and the 
Armed Forces have already been involved into reception policy especially concerning the so-
called “crisis situation caused by mass migration”.6 This, however, means standard procedure, 
as, according to the Government, Hungary has constantly been in “crisis situation caused by 
mass migration” since 2015.         
National Policies and Regulations 
The rules of reception are set forth by the Asylum Act (Act LXXX of 2007) and its 
corresponding Government Decree (301/2007 (XI. 9.)) on the implementation of the Act. The 
Asylum Act has gone through several amendments in the past four-year period, significantly 
deteriorating the situation of asylum seekers as well as the condition of reception. One of the 
most controversial issues is the establishment of transit zones along the Hungarian-Serbian 
border fence. Transit zones have essentially become the only reception facilities in the country 
over the past couple of years, and they function as de-facto detention centres (see below).  
 
Practices of Reception 
As of March 2018, irregular migrants may file asylum application in the transit zones only, and 
they cannot leave these zones throughout the entire asylum procedure. The rule applies to 
everyone except unaccompanied minors below 14; they are accommodated at Fót Children’s 
Home.7 The Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) had to step in and request for interim 
measures by the ECtHR to prevent the transfer of a pregnant woman and unaccompanied 
minors from open reception facilities to the transit zones.8 Thus, the only facilities that 
effectively receive asylum seekers are the transit zones at Röszke and Tompa, which serve 
as de facto detention centres. However, the conditions and practices in reception centres differ 
from the transit zones de jure. This necessitates a dual focus when discussing housing, 
services and allowances, and access to labour market and education for asylum seekers. It is 
notable that since the establishment of transit zones, the number of residents in reception 
                                               
4 See AIDA (2018) p.73. 
5 See Gov. Decree No. 126/2019 (V. 30.). 
6 See WP2 Report on border control. 
7 For detailed information on the situation and treatment of asylum seeking children in  
Hungary see HHC (2017b): Best Interest Out of Sight - The Treatment of Asylum Seeking  
Children in Hungary • 2017, Available online at:  
https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Best-interest-out-of-sight.pdf. 
8 See AIDA (2018) p. 72. 
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centres has decreased drastically. This is not to say that the number of people wishing to enter   
Hungary has gradually decreased. On the one hand, the Government has systematically 
limited access to the territory, and simultaneously shifted the place of reception from reception 




As of December 2018, there was only one person in Balassagyarmat, and two in 
Vámosszabadi – the two still operating reception centres in Hungary.9 Prior to March 2018, 
several reception facilities had been operation: Debrecen, once the biggest reception centre 
in the country, was shut down in October 2015;10 Nagyfa was shut down August 2016; Bicske 
in December 2016; Körmend has been suspended since May 2017; and Kiskunhalas was shut 
down in July 2018. Kiskunhalas was a former immigration detention centre, where asylum 
seekers were accommodated in shipping containers. The Körmend centre was effectively a 
camp comprising military tents. When open, the centre used to run throughout the year, 
irrespective of the exceptionally cold Hungarian winter. Only single men were placed in there 
in “extremely dire and inhuman conditions”.11 One of our interviewees who had been placed 
in Körmend described the place as “extremely terrifying”.12 Another interviewee said that there 
were always fights in Debrecen reception centre during his stay, the food was bad, and overall 
it was “so nervous place”.13 The still functioning centres, Balassagyarmat and Vámosszabadi 
would have a capacity of 140 and 210 places for asylum seekers respectively.14 According to 
Asylum Information Database, the building in Vámosszabadi used to serve as a barrack for 
Soviet soldiers stationed in Hungary.15 The Government announced its plan to shut down Fót 
Children’s Home in 2016. At the time of writing, however, the Home is still operating.  
Asylum seekers, except those placed in the transit zones or detained elsewhere, have free 
movement in the country. In case they wish to leave the reception centre for over 24 hours, 
they need to ask permission from NDGAP in writing. Due to the state of crisis, asylum seekers 
shall not move to private address any longer.16  
The physical specification of community shelters in general, such as reception centres, are 
set out in Gov. Decree No 239/2009 (X. 20.). Although regular cleaning is arranged, and the 
number of showers, toilets is satisfactory in all reception centres, the hygienic level raised 
some concerns at Vámosszabadi in 2017. The rooms are shared and families were otherwise 
accommodated in family rooms. The sleeping quarter doors were not always lockable, and 
the security guards were armed. The centres had computer and community rooms as well as 
sport fields. Asylum seekers could cook for themselves.17        
                                               
9 See AIDA (2018) p.67. Available at: https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary.  
10 See AIDA (2015) p. 11,21. 
11 See AIDA (2018) p. 73. 
12 See micro interview HUN2.  
13 Interview code: HUN9. 
14 See AIDA (2018) p. 72. 
15 See AIDA (2018)  p. 73.  
16 See AIDA (2018) p.70.  
17 See AIDA (2018) pp. 74-75.  
 
12 
There is no designated reception facility for vulnerable asylum seekers except the Fót 
Children’s Home for unaccompanied children: “Single women, female-headed families, and 
victims of torture and rape, as well as gay, lesbian or transgender asylum seekers are 
accommodated in the same facilities as others, with no specific attention, while there are no 
protected corridors or houses”.18 According to HHC, single women, as well as transgender 
asylum seekers complained about regular harassment by fellow asylum seekers on several 
occasions in 2016 and 2017, without the complaints being followed up by IAO.19 The age 
assessment of children is inadequate and malfunctioning,20 and there is no differentiation 
between nationalities as to their accommodation and placement.21  
Transit zones 
The vast majority of asylum seekers, a total of 588 people, were placed in transit zones in 
2018. The overall capacity of the zone is 450 persons at Röszke, and 250 at Tompa.22 One of 
the many reasons behind the infringement procedure launched against Hungary in December 
2015 was the incompatibility of transit zones with the EU law.23 Transit zones comprise 
shipping containers that both serve as accommodation for asylum seekers and where their 
asylum application is processed.24 While awaiting the outcome of their case, asylum seekers 
cannot leave the zones except its gate towards Serbia. This would however be equivalent to 
the withdrawal of their application. Unfortunately, during our field visit, it was not possible to 
gain access to the zones. Moreover, in November 2018, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention were also denied access to the zones.25 This practice of the NDGAP may change 
following a recent (October 2019) ECtHR decision (Szurovecz v. Hungary) in which the Court 
ruled that denying access to reception centres to the media constituted a breach of the right 
to freedom of expression, as the situation in reception centres, especially the rights of asylum 
seekers, is a matter of considerable public interest.26  
Notwithstanding the situation in Hungary, our request to visit the Subotica reception centre on 
the Serbian side was accepted by the Serbian authorities. The centre is the final destination 
for asylum seekers planning to enter the Hungarian transit zones. During our visit in December 
2018, we found that transit zones are not open for everyone save for a certain group of people. 
There is a preliminary, extra-territorial filtering process in place, seemingly,  with the informal 
consent of the Serbian authorities.27 This practice arguably amounts to a serious breach of 
the right to seek asylum, and thus incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, the Asylum Procedure and the Reception Conditions Directive. 
Transit zones are surrounded by barbed wire fence, and guarded and patrolled by armed 
military and/or police personnel. Asylum seekers have no privacy, there are cameras in every 
                                               
18 See AIDA (2018) p. 81. 
19 See AIDA (2018) p. 81. 
20 See WP1 pp. 48-51; HHC (2017b; 2018). 
21 See AIDA (2018) p. 82. 
22 See AIDA (2018) p. 84. 
23 See Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6228. 
24 See Gyollai and Korkut, 2019. 
25 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘UN human rights 
experts suspend Hungary visit after access denied’ Available online at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23879&LangID=E.  
26 The particular reception centre in Debrecen Mr. Szurovecz requested access to since has been 
shut down. 
27 See Ashraf, Korkut and Gyollai (2020) [Forthcoming]; Korkut and Gyollai (2018).  
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corner. Besides sleeping containers, there are dining-, community-, and shower containers as 
well as a shared prayer room. The containers are placed in a square with a courtyard in the 
middle that also serves as a playground for children.28 Although in December 2018 we had no 
chance to interview asylum seekers detained inside the facility or a single member of staff 
from the IAO, we interviewed a social worker who regularly visit the zones. According to our 
interviewee, there are neither trees nor any type of flora in transit zones, and children 
effectively play on a crushed-stone layer. The space is extremely limited, there is no room for 
kids to run around.29 The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) found the design of the zones “far too carceral”, 
despite families and children, including unaccompanied children were being forced to stay in 
these zones.30 Except for unaccompanied minors (children below 14), no other vulnerable 
groups are excluded from detention. The zones are divided into four sectors: one for single 
men, one for unaccompanied children, one for families, and one for those quarantined for 
health reasons. People can leave their designated sector only with the permission and 
escorted by armed guards. Single women and unaccompanied females are usually held 
together with families (i.e. together with males), there are no women-only places in the 
zones.31 Families are detained here for an average of 23 days,32 although our interviewee 
noted there were families who had to stay in for several months. At that time, she mentioned 
pregnant women, a wheelchaired person, as well as an autist child were among the 
detainees.33 Furthermore, the Hungarian government deliberately starved asylum seekers 
upon rejection of their application (see below).  
The ECtHR, following the intervention of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC), has issued 
interim measures on several occasions in this regard. Surprisingly, the major blow to asylum 
seekers detained in the zones (and to human rights advocates supporting them) did not come 
from the Government, but the ECtHR itself. Irrespective of the circumstances described above, 
as well as a plethora of criticism about the living conditions in the transit zones by distinguished 
organisations such as, inter alia, Amnesty International,34 EASO,35 UNHCR36 and HHC,37 
according to the position of the ECtHR Grand Chamber, placing asylum seekers in the transit 
zone does not amount to the deprivation of their liberty.   
Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary 
On 14 March 2017, in Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary (no. 47287/15) the ECtHR found that the 
confinement of two Bangladeshi nationals (who transited through Greece and Serbia) in the 
transit zones for 23 days constituted deprivation of their liberty.38 Following Hungary’s appeal 
                                               
28 See AIDA (2018) pp. 94-96. 
29 Interview code: HUNME2. 
30 Report to the Hungarian Government on the visit to Hungary carried out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT),p.4. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5ba213d17.html. 
31 See HHC (2018) pp. 8-9. 
32 See AIDA (2018) pp. 89-91. 
33 Interview code: HUNME2.  
34 See Amnesty: https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR2748642016ENGLISH.PDF.  
35 See EASO: http://www.europeanmigrationlaw.eu/documents/EASO-annual-report-2018.pdf.  
36 See UNHCR: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2017/9/59b809d24/unhcr-chief-visits-hungary-
calls-greater-access-asylum-end-detention-solidarity.html.  
37 See HHC: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/One-year-after-2019.pdf.  
38 The case also relates to the violation of art 3 and 13 of the Convention, we, however, now discuss 
the aspects of the judgement that relates to art 5 only.  
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against the judgement, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. In support 
of the Government, third-party interventions were filed by the Russian Federation, Bulgaria, 
Poland, and, in support of the applicants, by UNHCR, the Dutch Council for Refugees, the 
International Commission of Jurists and the European Commission on Refugees and Exiles 
and, separately, from five Italian scholars. The Grand Chamber delivered its judgement on 21 
November 2019, in which it overruled the Chamber’s earlier decision and maintained that the 
applicants were not deprived of their liberty in the meaning of Art. 5 of the Convention. The 
Grand Chamber effectively based its decision on the following main circumstances: a) to enter 
the transit zone and request for asylum was purely the applicants’ own “choice”; b) the duration 
of time spent in the transit zone should not be considered in a decisive manner when deciding 
whether Art 5 is applicable or not. In fact, given the circumstances, the 23-day period was 
relatively short; c) the applicants feared to return Serbia, even though that fear was real, only 
due to the possibility of their chain-refoulement, and not because of a direct threat to their life 
or health; d) the applicants’ have had a realistic opportunity to walk through the gate (instead 
of being forced to take a flight for example) and leave the transit zone towards Serbia. 
This reasoning is problematic for several reasons; in their dissent opinion,39 Judge Bianku and 
Vučinić explain why: a) regarding “choices”, the judges, first of all, point out that the case-law 
cited by the majority of judges “has nothing to do with asylum-seekers”, as the cases cited in 
the assessment all refer to regular circumstances of confinement. More significantly, the term 
“choice” in this context is not applicable. In fact, the applicants, and asylum seekers in general, 
had no other choice but to opt for entering the zones or otherwise to suffer from treatment 
contrary to Art 3 or 2. To support this view concerning the choice of crossing borders, the 
judges stresses: “we can see from European history that such “choices” have cost hundreds 
of people their lives”. As to the b) duration, the judges point out that in similar cases the Court 
has earlier considered that periods as short as of nine hours (in Nolan and K v. Russia) 
constituted detention. Regarding c) the applicants’ ground of fear to return Serbia, the judges 
underline that the majority opinion, wrongly, implies that any violation of art 5 could only be 
deemed in conjunction with that of art 3. Moreover, to decide whether the applicants’ would 
have faced a real risk of death or torture upon return to Serbia could only be safely declared 
following a detailed examination of the applicants’ personal circumstances respectively, the 
examination of which the Hungarian authorities failed to conduct. Adding to this point, we 
believe that the difference between the fear of being subjected to direct risk of death or torture 
and the fear of being returned to a country where one would face direct risk of death or torture 
is insignificant if not imaginary. Finally, d) the interpretation of the passage cited from Amur by 
the majority is totally “erroneous”. Concerning the question whether an individual has a real 
possibility to leave a country (the transit zone in the present case), what is at stake is not 
merely the practical and physical possibility to do so, e.g. the means of transport they actually 
have access to. The relevant question is whether there is, in fact, a country which inclined to 
take them in, and whether, upon departure, the individuals would be exposed to the risk of 
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treatment contrary to art 3. However, not only have the Hungarian authorities, again, failed to 
assess such risk, but the Grand Chamber accepted that the applicants had no legal basis to 
enter Serbia, hence their return would have resulted in a situation in which they could have 
been faced treatment contrary to art 3.                     
One could argue that the decision is concerning for multiple reasons: disregarding and/or 
misinterpreting a long-established line of case-law will arguably hinder adjudication processes 
of the Court in future cases concerning Art. 5 of the Convention. Such controversial decision 
has the potential to jeopardise the CJEU procedure against Hungary concerning the detention 
of asylum seekers in the transit zones as well as future similar cases. Most significantly, it may 
further deteriorate the situation of individuals detained in the zones.       
Early access to Education and Labour Market 
 
Reception centres 
As of March 2017, due to “crisis situation caused by mass migration”, asylum seekers have 
no access to labour market. As HHC notes, this is clearly at variance with the Reception 
Conditions Directive.40 Prior to that, those accommodated in reception centres had the 
opportunity to work within the centre without work permit. Nine months after submitting their 
application, they were also entitled to work outside the centre under the general conditions 
that apply to third country nationals. Such work permits were issued by local employment 
authorities for one year and extended upon request.41 However, one of our micro-level 
interviewees mentioned that without residence permit, he was unable to apply for jobs or 
language courses outside the centre.42 According to one of our meso-level interviewees, 
whether asylum seekers receive the necessary documents (ID, work permit) entirely depends 
on the goodwill of social workers employed in the centre. Asylum seekers were many times 
released without providing documents altogether. If lucky, they may be able to find 
accommodation in homeless shelters.43 Moreover, as of June 2016, the maximum length of 
stay in the centre upon recognition has been shortened to 30 days, which is an extremely 
short notice to arrange for accommodation and employment. We have interviewed the 
representative of Menedék Association, the major and first point of contact between asylum 
seekers and potential employers. The representative explained that, due to the increasing 
labour shortage in Hungary, they received numerous recruitment requests from employers in 
the past few years.44 Without the assistance of Menedék it is, however, difficult to find 
employment as a refugee. According to one of the asylum seekers we interviewed, people are 
“not willing” to employ refugees.45  
Up until the age of 16, asylum seeker children are entitled to public education under the same 
condition as locals.46 As HHC notes, in practice it depends on the availability of places in 
schools and “the willingness of guardians and the Children’s Home staff to ensure the speedy 
                                               
40 See AIDA (2018), p. 76. 
41 See AIDA (2018) p. 76. 
42 Interview code HUN2.; AIDA (2018) p. 107. 
43 Interview code: HUNME6. 
44 Interview code: HUNME3. 
45 Interview code: HUN16. 
46 Education is compulsory, in general, up until the age of 16. 
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enrolment of children”.47 In the past few years, 2018 was the first when each and every child 
in Fót Children’s Home was enrolled in and later attended schools. Given the specific needs 
of asylum seeker children, however, there were very few institutions that would accept them 
and would be able to provide appropriate education. Menedék offered alternative forms of 
education for asylum seeker children that were not enrolled. Both at Vámosszabadi and 
Balassagyarmat, asylum seekers faced serious obstacles towards having their children 
enrolled in some form of public education, despite the latter having a school in its premises.48 
Asylum seeker adults have access to education upon having granted international protection 
only. Language classes are provided by NGOs in reception centres on ad hoc basis.49 One of 
our micro-level interviewees mentioned that since the Government’s attitude changed towards 
NGOs (see below), they stopped providing language courses. Asylum seekers have to find 
alternative solutions and cover the expenses of the classes on their own.50     
Transit zones 
Asylum seekers whose asylum case is processed in the transit zone have never had access 
to the labour market neither inside nor outside the zones.51  
Prior to September 2017, no education was available for asylum seekers in transit zones. In 
Tompa transit zone it has since been organised by the Szeged Educational District and by the 
Kiskőrös Educational District in Röszke transit zone. Based on unaccompanied children’s 
account, who have participated in such educational programmes, HHC found that these 
programmes neither followed a particular curriculum, nor do they met the standard required 
for effective education.52 Classes were not “age-appropriate and teachers often lacked the 
necessary linguistic skills” to effectively perform their role. Handouts were merely focused on 
the development of basic skills of Hungarian language.53 
Services and Allowances 
 
Reception centres 
In reception centres, apart from health care, asylum seekers receive three meals per day as 
well as hygienic items (or equivalent amount of financial allowances). The amount of the 
weekly allowance (hygienic items and food voucher) is 6,650 HUF (21.36 EUR) for single men 
and children above the age of 3, and 7,000 HUF (22.48 EUR) for pregnant women and children 
below the age of 3.54 Due to the constant ‘state of crisis caused by mass migration’,55 travel 
allowances, reimbursement of educational expenses, financial support to facilitate potential 
                                               
47 See AIDA (2018) p. 76.  
48 See AIDA (2018) pp. 76-77. 
49 See AIDA (2018) p. 77. 
50 Interview code: HUN12. 
51 See WP1 report - ‘border procedure’ p. 31. 
52 See HHC (2018) p.12. 
53 See AIDA (2018) p. 77. 
54 See AIDA (2018) pp. 68-69. 
55 See WP2 report on border control. 
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return are now suspended. Asylum seekers are not entitled to pocket money since April 
2016.56  
Prior to 2018, social workers used to organise community activities for asylum seekers, such 
as language classes, film club, drawing-, music-, sport-, and cooking activities. With the 
freezing of AMIF funds, however, many social workers have lost their job. From then on, only 
NGOs organised such activities in reception centres. SOS Children’s Villages as well as 
Hungarian Red Cross used to organise programmes for asylum seeking children inside and 
outside the centre. The Menedék Association for Migrants provides legal counselling 
regarding employment and accommodation (property rental upon acceptance) matters. Not 
one of our micro-level interviewees mentioned that it was Menedék who found them a job.57 
To meet the basic needs of asylum seekers in reception, private donations and volunteers 
have also played an important role.58 This was corroborated by our meso-level interviewees.59 
Concerning healthcare services, asylum seekers are entitled to general and emergency 
healthcare services free of charge, and other healthcare services upon referral by general 
practitioners.60 Asylum seekers in reception centres have access to medical consultation, 
though the lack of interpretation often poses serious obstacles for communication.61 This was 
corroborated by our micro-level interview participants.62 Although the entitlement of people in 
vulnerable situation should be more inclusive than it is in general,63 in practice, there is no 
appropriate guideline to assess vulnerabilities in reception centres, nor in the transit zones 
(see below).64 Both SOS Children’s Villages and, more significantly, Cordelia Foundation 
provided psycho-social services in reception centres. The experts the Foundation are the only 
practitioners with necessary professional qualification and experience to provide adequate 
assistance for torture survivors, and people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As 
HHC notes, however, due to lack of sources the functioning of the Foundation is at constant 
risk.65 When interviewing former asylum seekers who had been accommodated in these 
reception centres, they showed appreciation and were grateful for the assistance and care 
provided by Cordelia.66    
Prior to the restriction (see above), asylum seekers waiting for the outcome of their case in 
private accommodation may have registered with their local GP. On several occasions, 
nonetheless, GPs refused the registration claiming that asylum seekers did not hold national 
insurance numbers, even though the humanitarian residence card was satisfactory and should 
have been accepted for registration.67  
Concerning information provision, the rights and obligations of asylum seekers regarding the 
asylum procedure is communicated to them both orally and in writing in a language they 
understand. Conversely, the information regarding their right and obligation in reception 
                                               
56 See AIDA (2018) pp. 68-69. 
57 Interview code: HUN8, HUN10; HUN16. 
58 See Aida (2018) p. 75.  
59 Interview code: HUNME7. 
60 See Art 26 of Asylum Act and art 26-28 of Asylum Decree. 
61 See AIDA (2018) p.79. 
62 Interview code: HUN10, HUN18. 
63 Art 32-34 of Asylum Decree. 
64 See AIDa (2018) p. 79; WP1 report on legal framework; HHC (2018). 
65 See AIDA (2018) p.79. 
66 Interview code: HUN10. 
67 See AIDA (2018) p. 80. 
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centres, the house rules were only provided in English and in Hungarian, posing a serious 
challenge to those who do not understand either one of these languages.68 This was 
corroborated when conducting our micro-level interviewees.69   
Transit zones 
There is ample evidence of how conditions in detention centres and reception facilities affect 
and deteriorate the mental health of asylum seekers in general.70 Various forms of post-
migratory stressors, such as the confinement itself, abuse by staff and isolation may increase 
asylum seekers’ already existing mental health issues resulting from previous exposure to 
traumatic events and/or torture. Prolonged detention increases the severity of depressive 
symptoms and may eventually result in cognitive deficits, psychotic symptoms and pervasive 
distrust.71 Uncertainty about the future contributes to ongoing depression, PTSD and other 
mental health-related issues, such as persistent sadness, hopelessness, intrusive memories, 
anger attacks and psychological reactivity.72 Moreover, it has been established that the 
duration of detention correlates with the emergence of new mental health problems.73 
Concerning the long-term mental health consequences of prolonged detention, asylum 
seekers may experience serious personal and interpersonal difficulties in the host community 
upon acceptance.74 Earlier research conducted in similar circumstances in Australia found that 
asylum seeker parents are likely to feel that they have failed to perform the regular parental 
roles, and are no longer able to offer comfort, emotional support to their children.75 The inability 
to protect their children from further humiliation, as well as from their own hopelessness, both 
contribute to their depression. Parental mental problem is often the source of the children’s 
trauma and anxiety, as such it may as well have serious impact on their social and emotional 
development. It creates a vicious circle, which clearly contributes to the re-traumatisation of 
asylum seekers. Both parents and children were diagnosed with symptoms of depression and 
suicidality in detention circumstances, and children sometimes had to witness their own 
parents’ suicide attempts. UK research have corroborated the above findings and observed 
similar changes in the child-parent relationship patterns in detention centres. Symptoms of 
depression and anxiety, sleeping problems, somatic complaints, behavioural difficulties and 
further emotional problems were regular among children.76  
Irrespective of the above, the Cordelia Foundation, similar to other NGOs who would provide 
crucial services to asylum seekers, has not been given access to transit zones.77 This 
information was corroborated by several sources during our field visit to Hungary. Hence the 
screening and treatment of asylum seekers’ mental health is insufficient, if not lacking 
altogether.78 HHC is aware of cases of suicide attempts in the transit zones, including a mother 
from an Afghan family. Prior to her attempt, the mother was provided with some psychological 
                                               
68 See (AIDA) p. 81. 
69 Interview code: HUN9. 
70 For summary see Robjant et al. (2009). 
71 See Sultan and O’Sullivan (2001); Fazel and Silove (2006). 
72 See Steel et al. (2006); Newman et al. (2013); Bosworth (2016). 
73 See Green and Eager (2010). 
74 See Coffey et al. (2010). 
75 See Steel et al. (2004); Mares et al. (2002). 
76 See Crawley and Lester (2005); Lorek et al. (2009). 
77 HHC (2018) p.10. 
78 Aee AIDA (2018) p. 98. 
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service though without interpretation.79 In order to see a doctor, consult their lawyer, or being 
interviewed, asylum seekers in the transit zones, including women and children, had to be 
escorted by armed police.80 One of our micro-level interviewees explained how intimidating is 
the constant presence of the police:  
“I mean, this all impression makes you scared, because when you're going for the 
interviews, you pass policemen around this room and when you enter that room, I 
mean, there used to be a policeman again, waiting for you here to come out. So, I 
mean, you enter that all office when you're scared. I mean, this alone makes you not... 
I mean, I don't know how to say it, even. Like, it makes you not to focus on what you're 
going to say. You're already scared of what's going to happen to you.”81 
The capacity of medical units in the zones capable is 10 persons respectively. While general 
practitioner is available daily, children’s doctor is only available twice a week. Whenever 
specialist care is necessary, asylum seekers are taken to medical institutions in the vicinity of 
the zones in prisoner transport vans. As HHC notes, “when pregnant women have to be taken 
for a medical examination, 2 or 3 policemen escort them to a nearby hospital” who then, at 
least in one reported occasion, were staying in the examining room during prenatal medical 
check-up.82 The woman was handcuffed during transport.83 This information was corroborated 
by different sources during our field visit in Hungary. Irrespective of the ECtHR’s intervention, 
no interpretation is provided for asylum seekers during the medical examination. As a general 
rule, asylum seekers receive painkillers for any type of health issue.84  
The assessment of vulnerable groups in special need, including LGBTI groups, their 
appropriate treatment, accommodation, and the training of staff in this regard is lacking 
altogether. No adequate support is provided for victims of domestic-, sexual- or gender based 
violence, of torture and for traumatised people.85 In order to remove vulnerable people from 
the zones, among 15 requests, HHC obtained interim measure for a family of six with a 10-
year-old child in a wheelchair.86  
According to one of our meso-level interviewees, asylum seekers mainly received canned 
food, they had no access to a diverse or healthy diet unless social workers provided them with 
some vegetable and fruit.87 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, deprivation of food for asylum 
seekers placed in transit zones has become standard procedure in transit zones. Accordingly, 
the UNHCR expressed serious concerns about this “deeply shocking” practice of the 
authorities.88 In the case reported by the UNHCR, two Afghani families were deprived of food 
for five days, who were then given the opportunity to either being flown back to Kabul on a 
                                               
79 See AIDA (2018) p. 71. 
80 See AIDA (2018) pp. 90-96. 
81 Interview code: HUN12 
82 See AIDA (2018) p. 97. 
83 See HHC (2018) p. 11. 
84 See AIDA (2018) p. 97. 
85 See HHC (2018). 
86 See AIDA (2018) p. 99. 
87 Interview code: HUNME2. 
88 See UNHCR ‘Hungary’s coerced removal of Afghan families deeply shocking’ Available  






flight organised by Frontex or leaving the transit zone towards Serbia. The families opted for 
the latter option. Given the circumstances, the UNHCR called on Frontex to refrain from 
providing support to IAO in executing return decisions. According to our source from the transit 
zones, when the practice commenced, several IAO staff members denied to announce the 
order due to its unprecedented cruelty. Information on the planned measure was, fortunately, 
leaked, so that the effected asylum seekers managed to save some of their scheduled food 
portions.89 Between August 2018 and May 2019, the overall number of such starvation cases 
reached 13 affecting 21 individuals.90 Since deprivation of food for asylum seekers detained 
in the transit zones is a serious breach of both the Return Directive and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Commission opened a new infringement 
procedure against Hungary in July 2019,91 and ultimately referred the case to the CJEU in 
October 2019.92 According to Lajos Kósa, a member of the Government: “the ten million 
tourists who enter Hungary are not fed by the state either, it cannot be however said that they 
would be starved.”93  
Encounter with officials, civic actors and the receiving society 
Officials 
According to HHC, asylum seekers, including gay individuals, have been verbally abused 
and/or threatened by security guards in one of the reception centres.94 When transgender 
people were abused by fellow residents in Vámosszabadi reception centre, the authorities 
offered no resolution of the situation.95 Since there has been no adequate conflict resolution 
mechanism in place in general, furthermore the English language skills of security personnel 
has been falling short of the necessary minimum, conflict management in the centre has been 
far from appropriate.96 Research in UK detention facilities have demonstrated that poor 
communication with the staff within the centres make asylum seekers feel depressed and 
vulnerable,97 and imply incidents of abuse.  
Our micro-level interviewees complained about the majority of staff in reception centres not 
speaking the English language and being “unfriendly” or only some of them being “friendly”.98 
Being escorted while handcuffed, our interviewees found the practice “shocking” and felt being 
                                               
89 Interview code: HUNME4. 
90 See Council of Europe report on ‘Pushback policies and practice in Council of Europe member  
States’ Available online at:  
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/pushback-policies-and-practice-council-europe-member-states. 
91 See European Commission ‘Commission takes Hungary to Court for criminalising activities in  
support of asylum seekers and opens new infringement for non-provision of food in transit zones’  
Brussels, 25 July 2019, Available online at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4260.  
92 See Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_5994. 
93 See 24.hu ‘Kósa: Nincs éheztetés a tranzitzónákban, a turistáknak sem ad enni a magyar  
állam. Available online at:  
https://24.hu/belfold/2019/11/18/tranzitzona-eheztetes-fogvatartas-kosa-lajos-szel-bernadett-honv 
edelmi-bizottsag/.  
94 See HHC (2018) p. 19.; AIDA (2018) p. 75 
95 See HHC (2018) p. 19. 
96 See AIDA (2018) p. 75. 
97 See Bosworth and Kellezi (2015); Bosworth (2016). 
98 Interview code HUN4; HUN9. 
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treated like criminals.99 One of our interviewees said that, during his stay in Debrecen 
reception centre the security staff, although “nice people”, said that they were not allowed to 
talk to the residents, not even to give a handshake, and never did because of the CCTV.100 
Another interviewee mentioned that in Debrecen, when his fingerprints were to be taken, he 
was escorted with a rein or leash attached to his handcuff; he felt he was treated “like a dog”. 
The interviewee also said that he was offered by staff to be transferred from the closed centre 
to an open one if he paid 1.000 EUR.101 The practice of escorting people while handcuffed on 
a leash was as well confirmed by one of our meso-level interviewees even concerning 
pregnant women.102       
Two refugee participants of our migration governance network meeting held in Budapest said 
that they were falsely diagnosed and treated by healthcare professionals in Hungary: 
 
“I was playing football and I broke my hand. I was in the hospital, standing in the queue, 
waiting for the doctor to check me. I was in pain, it was really an emergency, but the 
doctor said no, it wasn’t.”103 
 
“I was injured on my hand, my foot, it was four or five hours of night walking from Serbia 
to Hungary. I almost passed out, even they called the ambulance (...) Ambulance 
arrived and they thought, though I could see, my eyes were open, but couldn’t speak 
or move, no emergency treatment needed.”104 
 
Our micro level interviewees mention use of excessive force by the police at the border and 
during the asylum process:  
 
“Eventually we were caught by the police in the forest in Hungary. They beat up the 
young ones. They didn’t hurt us because I went into the water with my son.”105 
 
“...the police came and was like yeah what are you doing here and I say yeah I'm a 
refugee so they kick my bag so like my shoes and stuff fall and then they was laughing 
to us and I was like really feel bad that time.”106 
  
These accounts show that our interviewees’ encounter with the authorities did not always meet 
the minimum standard of an adequate reception policy. Excessive force by the police is 
especially unacceptable, given the vulnerable situation of asylum seekers.  
Civil society actors 
Civil society organisations have been under attack by the Hungarian Government. The 
legislative offensive started with Act LXXVI of 2017 that obliged foreign-funded NGOs to 
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register with the authorities for reasons of transparency in June 2017.107 The Venice 
Commission condemned the new law for its clear interference with the freedom of association 
and expression, the right to privacy, and the prohibition of discrimination.108 As per the Venice 
Commission’s Opinion, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure 
against Hungary due to the incompatibility of the Act with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in July 
2017.109 Later in December, the case was referred to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU).110 Shortly after the infringement procedure in July 2017, the Government 
introduced the so-called “Stop Soros” legislative package in May 2018. The legislative 
package comprises, inter alia, amendments to the Criminal Code that effectively criminalised 
NGOs, civil society actors providing humanitarian support for asylum seekers.111 Since the 
package constituted a further breach of the right of freedom of association and expression, it 
was followed by criticism of the Venice Commission.112 Hence, the package  resulted in yet 
another infringement procedure due to its incompatibility of the Reception Conditions, the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, the Free Movement 
Directive and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In conjunction with the new infringement 
procedure, in July 2018 the Commission referred the earlier infringement procedure 
concerning the transit zones (December 2015) to the CJEU. This was due to a newly 
introduced provision provided for the indefinite detention of asylum seekers in the zones 
constituting a serious breach of the Reception Conditions Directive.113 The response of the 
Government came soon enough: in August 2018, it introduced the ‘special immigration tax’, 
i.e. the imposition of 25% tax on civil society organisations whose activity involves the support 
of migrants/asylum seekers.114 The respective opinion of the Venice Commission was 
released in December 2018.115 The latest development (?) in the legislative debate between 
the EU and the Hungarian Government concerning civil society organisations took place in 
July 2019: in parallel with opening new infringement procedure due to the deprivation of food 
for asylum seekers in the transit zones (see above), the Commission referred the case of 
criminalising activities in support of asylum to the CJEU.116 The court referral was preceded 
by a letter of formal notice sent to the Hungarian Government in July 2018, which the 
Government had failed to adequately address.     
                                               
107 See in English, HHC:  
https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/LexNGO-adopted-text-unofficial-ENG-14June2017.p 
df.   
108 See Venice Commission:  
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2017)015-e.  
109 See European Commission:  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1982.  
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https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_5003.  
111 See WP2 Report pp. 21-22.; Gyollai and Korkut (2018):  
http://responders.crs.uu.se/2018/08/22/the-atmosphere-of-fear-taking-its-toll-in-hungary/.  
112 See Venice Commission:  
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113 See Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4522. 
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One may find it difficult to follow the reports issued by the Venice Commission relating to 
immigration and asylum issues, and the infringement procedures launched, and the 
subsequent court procedures against Hungary. We have to underline that no measure or 
criticism has so far deterred the Hungarian Government from further developing what they call 
its illiberal state model affecting migration management as well. The ultimate question is, 
whether these procedures can wage an impact or not.  
Each stakeholder we interviewed expressed concerns about the Government’s freezing 
access to AMIF funds. As a consequence, NGOs are forced to be selective, refocus activities, 
cut down on expenses and search for alternative sources. Only a selection of NGOs has 
access to transit zones, the others are banned from both the zones and from reception 
centres. One of the NGOs we have been in touch had to move to a significantly smaller office 
and ask colleagues to work from home due to lack of funds. They can only carry on with their 
activities in support of refugees, if cooperate and share facilities with fellow NGOs. NGOs are 
shrinking and facing serious existential challenges due to the Government’s explicit aversion 
against civil society. The Government provides financial support and access to transit zones 
only for the members of its own Charity Council (Karitatív Tanács) including Catholic Caritas, 
Hungarian Reformed Church Aid, Hungarian Charity Service of the Order Malta, Hungarian 
Interchurch Aid, Hungarian Baptist Aid and the Hungarian Red Cross.117 However, it is not 
precisely clear what services and at what regularity these organisations provide in the zones 
as per our interviewees. Conversely, as of June 2017, as one of the most established and 
internationally recognised Hungarian NGOs, HHC was banned from all detention and 
reception facilities nationwide. The cooperation agreements between HHC and IAO, National 
Police Headquarters and the National Penitentiary Headquarters to monitor the rights of 
individuals detained or confined in such facilities were unilaterally terminated.118 Although 
HHC as organisation was thus banned from entering the transit zones, through its lawyers, 
the NGO remains the only organisation that provides effective legal aid for asylum seekers in 
Hungary.119 This was corroborated by our micro-level interviewees.120  
Civil society organisations would have (and have had) crucial role in reception. In the micro-
level interviews, almost all our participants mention the invaluable support they received from 
members of NGOs both in reception centres and upon acceptance, among others from 
Artemisszió, HHC, Menedék, Cordelia, Kalumba, Hungarian Baptist Aid, Hungarian Charity 
Service of the Order Malta.121 According to our interviewees, NGOs in general were proved to 
be more helpful than the authorities.122   
                                               
117 See FRA: https://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/asylum-migration-borders/overviews/sept-2017;  
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-february-migration-report-focus-five-c 
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http://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/helsinki_adatkeres_karitativ_tanacs.pdf.  
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119 See Magyar Narancs:  
https://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/kontenerek-es-paragrafusok-113413/?orderdir=novekvo; HHC 
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Experienced “welcome culture” 
The Hungarian Government’s attempts to generate an audience for its agenda have been 
successful given how a significant proportion of the Hungarian public has identified with the 
government’s narratives of exclusion. There is an increasing level of intolerance and public 
hatred against foreigners.123 During our field visits to Hungary, we conducted interviews with 
various stakeholders involved in the implementation of refugee protection, reception and 
integration policies. We have found that these organisations face serious obstacles to their 
efforts to support refugees as a result of the government’s anti-immigrant campaign. Almost 
all of our interviewees, including representative of IOM Hungary, raised concerns about the 
increasing racial and ethnic discrimination against refugees in the Hungarian society. 
Members of NGOs and charities responsible for housing have been experiencing suspicion 
and aversion, and, in most cases, rejection by landlords when organising accommodation for 
already recognised refugees leaving the reception centres.124 Even if these organisations 
cover both the deposit and the rent, they sometimes had to make 10 attempts to secure a 
lease. According to one of our meso-level interviewees, a co-organiser of the “Migration 
Information Desk” at the Council of Budapest to provide assistance with public administration 
for immigrants living in Budapest, there is a certain degree of institutional racism in the public 
sector. The interviewee recited how he himself was discriminated by his own colleagues at 
the council on one occasion when assisting a client with immigrant background. To 
demonstrate the direct link between the government’s campaign and the increasing 
xenophobia, Artemisszió shared a story of a long-resident refugee, who suffered severe 
physical abuse by his fellow villagers with whom he had otherwise maintained a good 
relationship prior to the billboard campaign. The asylum seekers we have interviewed 
corroborated the accounts of public intolerance, and explained how difficult it is for them to 
socialise with locals due to the government’s anti-immigrant stance and campaigns:  
 
“Actually, before it wasn't affecting too much, but it all came when the government 
started like... Doing this propaganda, saying migrants are bad, asylum seekers want 
to take away Hungarian jobs... Then, it's all during that time when everything started 
to change a bit, people's reactions towards us started to change a bit, to shift. Before 
people were very friendly and then, right now, I could say that some people are drawing 
that line between us and them. They don't want to be friendly, they see us as a negative 
influence to people…”125  
 
“In Budapest people aren’t that friendly, I don’t even have a good friend in Hungary...It 
is impossible to communicate with people over 35-40, because they hate that we live 
here. They ask ‘why did you come here?’ Younger people are more open. In my 
working place I was told not to tell customers that I am from Afghanistan, and it would 
be better to say I am from Spain or something like that, but I am from Afghanistan, it is 
my identity”126      
 
“People suffer (...) because of the government and the media.”127 
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“...but all the place I go where say I'm refugee the first thing that I am saying but the 
people they are good but some places but there was not the centre city it was different 
far away from centre city they got crazy they stop the bus the next station they kicked 
me off I swear God they said get off the bus I was like get off like it was far but I was 
shocked for.”128 
 
“...in the Hungarian National Bank I can't open an account, because they say "You are 
from Iran and Iran is (...)". They don't care...many things are closed for us (...) it's very 
difficult for me and for all the refugees, because it's really... It's bad (...) the TV to 
refugees and everytime is propaganda. No one wants to rent the flat for refugees and 
I found it really difficult one flat, now I live there for three years, I don't want to live there 
(laughter). I can't find... They don't believe, they don't trust us... Many people, because 
of the propaganda on the TV.”129  
 
Wages paid for refugees are way below average, workplace exploitation is not uncommon.130 
One of our interviewees mentioned that she has been regularly tasked with physically 
overwhelming duties outside her job description. Because of language barriers, however, she 
was unable to raise these issues.131 Others found the working conditions discriminative and 
humiliating:    
   
“In my working place people shows they like you, but they want to use you. My 
colleagues like kidding with me, but if I do so, they get offended immediately. Every 
Hungarian has holiday, except us, the Asians, who work in the kitchen. We hardly have 
day off and we work a lot. Just look at my hands. [His hands were totally dry: they were 
overused.]”132 
  
One of our interviewees found it difficult to communicate with the locals, because the vast 
majority of the Hungarians, apart from Budapest, do not speak the English language.133 Upon 
being granted status, it took 6 months to another participant to find accommodation in 
Budapest as no one was willing to rent him any property.134 Yet another asylum seeker, upon 
acceptance, had already agreed the purchase of different properties with 15 different owners 
who eventually all pulled out of the deal.135 As HHC notes, according to Menedék, many 
schools are reluctant to receive asylum seeker children because local parents would disagree 
with the idea of their children sharing classes with foreigners. Some schools accept asylum 
seeking children in segregated classes only, without a meaningful pedagogical programme 
and only for 2 hours a day; as opposed to local children, who spend 5-7 hours in school per 
day.136 
  
                                               
128 Interview code: HUN14. 
129 Interview code: HUN19. 
130 Interview code: HUN20. 
131 Interview code: HUN. 
132 Interview code: HUN10. 
133 Interview code: HUN17. 
134 MGN meeting. 
135 MGN meeting. 
136 See AIDA (2018) p. 77. 
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Conclusion: Challenges, prospects and policy 
recommendations 
 
Reiterating our findings in the earlier border management and migration control report on 
Hungary, this report also reaches pessimistic conclusions regarding prospects and 
challenges. Moreover, it is impossible to suggest any policy recommendation to the Hungarian 
government, given its centralised and unaccountable control over the migration policy in 
general and reception policy in particular. We are hopeful that this report will raise attention to 
the Hungarian case internationally, affecting the current infringement procedures.  
However, the most recent judgement of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights granting a wide margin of appreciation to Hungary of its right to control its borders is 
disheartening and generally fails our expectations from the international community to hold 
the Hungarian government accountable for inhuman treatment of asylum-seekers. Despite the 
alarming report of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention categorising 
Hungary’s policy of holding asylum seekers in the transit zones, a deprivation of liberty under 
international law; the judgement of the Grand Chamber on 21 November 2019 established the 
right of the Hungarian government to control its control borders. However, the infringement 
proceedings initiated earlier by the EC, the first-instance judgement of the ECtHR in Ilias and 
Ahmed v. Hungary, and flagrant criticism of international organisations has forced the 
Hungarian Government to look for other ways in pursuit of its asylum policy. Hence, the 
Government has adopted certain security practices, the responsibility for which could not be 
attributed to Hungary, and externalised its securitisation policy through bilateral cooperation 
with neighbouring Serbia to informally control irregular arrivals extraterritorially. 
To conclude, we once again indicate that Hungarian government operates its migration 
management and effectively reception policies amidst a full lack of accountability measures. 
The Hungarian government since being elected to office in 2010 unleashed an attack on 
independent agencies of checks and balances. The trend has started with curbing the 
influence of the courts. It continued with attacks on the civil society groups. Finally, given EU’s 
reticence and slowness to act on the infringement procedures, the Hungarian government is 
feeling that the international accountability procedures are also becoming limited. This goes 
to the importance of accountability procedures in political systems to make sure that checks 
and balances work properly to control unaccountable acts that political leaders and 
governments would follow otherwise. The government discourse has monopolised migration 
policy so extensively that any opposition to its policies is branded as treason against the nation 
and Christianity. We wish to underline this as the most important policy finding in this report 
insomuch as refugee matters are too delicate to be left into the hands of the government 
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Policy Recommendations 
Any policy recommendation based on the current reception system should consider the 
audience that these recommendations would target. We believe that in the Hungarian case 
there are three possible audiences. These are namely the Hungarian government, the NGOs, 
and the EU institutions.  
While we are not too optimistic regarding the impact of our policy recommendations on 
the Hungarian government, our starting point is Hungary’s international obligations and 
responsibilities under European Union law. The Hungarian government should safeguard 
complete adherence to its international obligations and the oversight of its respective 
authorities. Adherence also implies accountability and transparency. At the moment, the 
Hungarian reception centres, that is, the transit zones are beyond the supervision of both 
domestic and international humanitarian agencies. In order to live up to the statements that 
the Hungarian government is not failing to deliver its international human rights obligations, 
the independent oversight mechanisms should be established. The best way to do this is by 
providing access to independent humanitarian actors and international agencies including the 
UN agencies.  
This brings us to the role that humanitarian organisations should assume in this 
inhospitable environment. What we witnessed during our field wok in Hungary was complete 
resignation in the humanitarian sector. We have seen that many are fighting for survival, face 
financial insecurity, and even changed their scope of work. However, they have to be mindful 
of their rights and not give up on the fact that Hungary is a democratic EU member state. The 
atmosphere of fear has been discouraging for many, but this environment should not subdue 
the humanitarian sector fully. These agencies at the same time should be more forthcoming 
with their rights and not let the governmental authority encroach fully in their work and affect 
their enthusiasm.  
However, in order for humanitarian agencies to enjoy much deserved stability and support, 
the EU should also make sure that Hungarian government is held accountable. So far it has 
been the European Parliament that took a stance against Hungary. Recently, EPP is showing 
its teeth against Fidesz. However, what we need is the European Council coming more to fore 
and becoming responsive to the demands of the EP as well as independent oversight 
agencies. They need to take the infringement process seriously and not let this affected by 





APPENDICES: OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
ON RECEPTION 
 
Legislation title (original / English) and 
number 
Type of law Link 
39/2016. (XII. 29.) BM utasítás a Bevándorlási 
és Menekültügyi Hivatal szervezeti és működési 
rendjének meghatározásáról / Ministry of Interior’s 
Order No. 39/2016. (XII. 29.) on the Institutional 







2012. évi C törvény a Büntető 




2007.    évi    LXXX.    törvény    a 





301/2007. (XI. 9.) Korm. rendelet 
a   menedékjogról   szóló   2007.   évi 
LXXX.    törvény    végrehajtásáról    / 
Government   Decree   301/2007   (XI. 
9.)   on   the   implementation   of   Act 




2007. évi LXXXIX. törvény az államhatárról / 
Act LXXXIX. of 2007 on the State Border 
Act  https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?doci
d=A0700089.TV.  
1994 évi XXXIV. törvény a Rendőrségről / Act 
XXXIV. of 1994 on the Police 
Act https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?doci
d=99400034.TV.  
2011. évi CXIII. törvény a honvédelemről és a 
Magyar Honvédségről, valamint a különleges 
jogrendben bevezethető intézkedésekről / Act CXIII 
of 2011 on National Defence and Hungarian 
Defence Forces, and Measures Adoptable during 




    25/2015 (IX. 14.) BM-HM együttes utasítás a 
Magyar Honvédségnek a rendőrségi feladatok 
ellátásában történő közreműködése rendjéről / 
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence Joint 
Order No. 25/2015 (IX. 14.) on the Armed Forces’ 
Participation in Policing Duties  
Order https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?doci
d=A15U0025.BM&getdoc=1.  
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1401/2015 (VI. 17.)  Korm. határozat a 
rendkívüli bevándorlási nyomás kezelése 
érdekében szükséges egyes intézkedésekről  Gov. 
Decision No. 1401/2015 (VI. 17.) on the measures 




2018 évi XLI. törvény az egyes adótörvények 
és más kapcsolódó törvények módosításáról, 
valamint a bevándorlási különadóról / Act XLI. of 
2018 Amending Certain Tax Laws and Other 







52/2007 (XII. 11.) IRM rendelet a menekültügy 
szervezeti rendszeréről / Ministry of Justice Decree 
No. 52/2007 (XII. 11) on the Institutional Structure 
of the Asylum System 
Decree https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?doci
d=A0700052.IRM.  
2017. évi LXXVI. törvény a külföldről támogatott 
szervezetek átláthatóságáról / Act LXXVI of 2017 









2015. évi XLII. törvény a rendvédelmi feladatokat 
ellátó szervek hivatásos állományának szolgálati 
jogviszonyáról / Act XLII of 2015 on the Service 









126/2019. (V. 30.) Korm. rendelet az 
idegenrendészeti szerv kijelöléséről és 
hatásköréről / Gov. Decree No. 126/2019 (V. 30.) 
on the assignment and jurisdiction of the 








239/2009. (X. 20.) Korm. rendelet a szálláshely-
szolgáltatási tevékenység folytatásának részletes 
feltételeiről és a szálláshely-üzemeltetési engedély 
kiadásának rendjéről / Gov. Decree No. 239/2009 
on the detailed conditions of providing continuous 
shelter-service activity and the rules on the 
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